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Verbal disputes and topic continuity
Viktoria Knoll
Institute of Philosophy, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany
ABSTRACT
Changing concepts comes with a risk of creating merely verbal disputes.
Accounts of topic continuity (such as Herman Cappelen’s) are supposed to
solve this problem. As this paper shows, however, no existing solution avoids
the danger of mere verbalness. On the contrary, accounts of topic continuity
in fact increase the danger of overlooking merely verbal disputes between
pre- and post-ameliorators. Ultimately, this paper suggests accepting the
danger of mere verbalness resulting from a change in topic as a downside of
conceptual engineering. Changing the topic under discussion may be worth
the risk, however, in many cases. In fact, this paper proposes that the main
goal of conceptual engineering should be seen as changing topics for the
better.
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1. Conceptual engineering and the danger of mere verbalness
Disputes in philosophy and elsewhere have all kinds of interesting flaws.
Sometimes there is just no fact of the matter as to which party is correct.
Sometimes it is epistemically impossible to find out who is right. And
sometimes disputants are merely talking past each other. This paper
focuses on the latter phenomenon, investigating the relation between
merely verbal disputes and the project of conceptual engineering/
ethics.1 That there might be an interesting relation between mere verbal-
ness and the amelioration of concepts should not come as a surprise, for
conceptual engineering can easily be seen as increasing the danger of
merely verbal disputes between pre- and post-ameliorators. Let’s look
at this supposed downside of conceptual engineering in a bit more detail.
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Viktoria Knoll viktoria.knoll@tu-dresden.de Institute of Philosophy, Technische Uni-
versität Dresden, Helmholtzstraße 10, 01069 Dresden, Germany
1Potential differences between projects of (i) conceptual engineering, (ii) conceptual ethics and (iii) con-
ceptual amelioration can be ignored for the purposes of this paper. See Cappelen and Plunkett (2020)
or Scharp (2020) regarding the distinction between (i) and (ii).
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Over the last few years, philosophers have come up with several
accounts of merely verbal disputes (Hirsch 2005; Chalmers 2011;
Brendan Balcerak Jackson 2014; Jenkins 2014; Vermeulen 2018). It
seems fair to say, though, that there is widespread agreement regarding
two general conditions: in a merely verbal dispute (i) there is no rel-
evant disagreement2 between the disputants, but (ii) they use at least
one key expression of their dispute with different speaker’s meaning
(see Section 2 for more details). When conceptual engineers suggest
revising (or replacing) a concept c, they also suggest changing the
way people use terms to express c.3 They hope to change the
meaning of such terms for the better. Meaning change, however,
comes at a certain price: changing the meaning of a linguistic
expression e, its intension and usually also its extension, increases the
likelihood of speakers merely talking past each other. After all, to estab-
lish a new meaning takes some time: some speakers start to use e with
its ameliorated meaning and only gradually more will follow suit.4 Thus,
during the transition period, many speakers within the same linguistic
community use e differently. Some speakers use e in its ameliorated
meaning, although they might know that their divergent, and often
semantically (still) incorrect usage of e comes at a high communicative
risk. On the other hand, there is the camp of pre-ameliorators who still
use e the old way. (Maybe they simply missed the whole debate about c
and e; or maybe they don’t think the suggested meaning change is a
change for the better, and therefore refuse to use e in its ameliorated
meaning). Changing the meaning of e leads to pre- and post-ameliora-
tors using e differently. Using a shared expression differently, though, is
one of the defining features of merely verbal disputes. Therefore,
2Here ‘disagree(ment)’ is used to refer to states and not activities (see Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009,
60f) or McFarlane (2014, 119) regarding this distinction). Thus disagreement is a matter of conflicting
mental states, while disputes are to be understood in behavioural terms (Jenkins 2014, 13; Vermeulen
2018, 333).
3Whether conceptual engineering is best seen as merely changing concepts or as a project of replacing
concepts with better ones (because concepts cannot be changed) is an open question. See e.g. Scharp
(2020, 405f) on the distinction between these two options. Rather than siding with the replacement or
revisionist camp, in its latter part this paper explores potential consequences of choosing between the
two options.
4See Sterken (2020, 420-1) regarding different options for ameliorators to facilitate a meaning change of
an expression e. In her article, Sterken is particularly interested in this option: the ameliorator inten-
tionally misuses e without making her semantically divergent usage manifest to the audience. The
ameliorator uses e as if e already had the ameliorated meaning (though it does not). According to
Sterken, this kind of linguistic intervention often leads to serious communicative disruptions, such
as misattributions in speech and faulty chains of testimony. Somewhat surprisingly, though, Sterken
ultimately argues for embracing these disruptions, as they are often transformative for the audience,
getting speakers to reflect on their usage of e.
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conceptual engineering increases the risk of speakers merely talking
past each other.5
In the literature on conceptual engineering, this threat of mere ver-
balness is being tackled as one important aspect of a more general
underlying problem: the problem of topic (dis)continuity. This
problem goes back to Peter Strawson’s critique of Carnap’s method of
explication (Strawson 1963, 505). Ameliorating concepts, according to
Strawson, simply changes the topic of conversation. Take for example
a philosophical debate on the question ‘What are Fs?’. If conceptual
engineers suggest changing the meaning of ‘F’ from [F ] to [F*], so the
objection goes, their suggestion does nothing to help solve the original
question under discussion. Instead, changing the meaning of ‘F’ ‘simply
changes the subject’ (Haslanger 2000, 34). Or as Michael Prinzing
(2018, 856) recently put it:
The thought is that a change in concept means a change in subject. A change in
subject means that anything we think or say will be beside the point. We won’t
be able to answer the questions that initially motivated our inquiry. We won’t
be able to communicate successfully with anyone using the pre-engineering
concepts. In short, C[onceptual]E[ngineering] results in discontinuity of
subject, thought, inquiry and/or communication.
Disputants in a merely verbal dispute obviously fail to ‘communicate suc-
cessfully’ with one another. Prinzing seems to be hinting here at a close
relation between discontinuity of topic and the danger of mere verbal-
ness in the passage quoted.
Much of Herman Cappelen’s Fixing Language is an attempt to answer
the problem of topic (dis)continuity, and he is much more explicit than
Prinzing about the problematic liaison between a discontinuity of topic
and merely verbal disputes. According to Cappelen (2018, 8), changing
the topic of inquiry or conversation creates ‘massive amounts of verbal
dispute’. A continuity of topic, in contrast, ‘enables us to avoid verbal dis-
putes’, according to Cappelen. ‘Extensions and intensions might have
changed, but as long as we’re still talking about the same thing, the
danger of verbal dispute is avoided.’ (2018, 114)
Cappelen (2020, 140) repeats his view on the relation between topic
change and the creation of merely verbal disputes:
5Note that having a merely verbal dispute is just one way for two or more disputants to talk past each
other (see Jenkins (2014, 22) on mishearings). The distinction between merely verbal disputes and
other disputes in which speakers are merely talking past each other is not important for the purposes
of this paper however.
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Pre-ameliorators using ‘F’ will be talking about something other than those
using ‘F’ post-amelioration. The result of the amelioration will be a change of
topic. That, again, can lead to verbal disputes: The pre-ameliorator asserted
‘Fs are G’ and the post-ameliorators say ‘Fs are not G’. It looks like a disagree-
ment, but if there’s been a change in meaning of ‘F’, then there’s no
disagreement.
The danger of mere verbalness resulting from a change in topic is one of
Cappelen’s main motivations for coming up with an account of topic con-
tinuity (2018, 113–4). As this paper argues, however, Cappelen’s account
of topic continuity does nothing, in fact, to avoid the danger of merely
verbal disputes arising between pre- and post-ameliorators. On the con-
trary, Cappelen’s account actually increases the danger of overlooking
such disputes.
This paper is a further investigation of the relation between mere ver-
balness and topic continuity. Section 2 provides an introduction to the
phenomenon of merely verbal disputes. Discussing several sample
cases, it is demonstrated in this section how surprisingly subtle differ-
ences in disputants’ usage of an expression can lead to merely verbal dis-
putes between them. Cappelen’s account of topic continuity is presented
in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to demonstrating how disputants can
talk about the same topic in Cappelen’s sense and still have a merely
verbal dispute. Section 5 provides a discussion of certain consequences
of this. Sections 6 and 7 accommodate the fact that avoiding the risk of
merely verbal disputes is not the sole reason why conceptual engineers
consider topic continuity a worthwhile aim. Taking pre- and post-ameli-
orators as talking about the same topic allegedly also captures some of
our intuitions about topic continuity (see e.g. Prinzing’s quote above). I
offer an alternative way to account for such intuitions, ultimately
arguing that the main goal of conceptual engineering should be seen
as changing topics for the better.
2. Merely verbal disputes and topics
Building on Brendan Balcerak Jackson’s prominent account, this section
introduces the phenomenon of merely verbal disputes. As we shall see,
Balcerak Jackson’s account is particularly helpful for the purposes of
this paper because it spells out the relation between subject (matters)/
topics6 and merely verbal disputes in an intuitively compelling way.
6The terms ‘topic(s)’ and ‘subject matter(s)’ are used interchangeably in this paper.
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To illustrate Balcerak Jackson’s account, let’s take a look at a simple
example of a merely verbal dispute:
(1)
Anna: ‘One billion is 1012.’
Bertie: ‘No, one billion is not 1012.’
Assume that Anna thinks the English word ‘billion’ is synonymous with
the German expression ‘Billion’. Therefore, by uttering ‘One billion is
1012’ Anna actually wants to convey the thought that one trillion is 1012
– which is correct. Only by mistake she uses ‘billion’ with speaker’s
meaning [trillion], the meaning of the German ‘Billion’. Bertie, on the
other hand, uses ‘billion’ to refer to 109. Furthermore, the two speakers
agree on all mathematical facts relevant for their dispute – the fact that
one trillion is 1012 as well as the fact that one billion is not 1012. They
merely present the appearance of disagreement due to their divergent
uses of ‘billion’.7
Thus, in the context given, Anna’s and Bertie’s dispute displays the two
essential features of a merely verbal dispute already mentioned in Section
1: there is a lack of relevant disagreement between them, and they use a
key expression8 of their dispute differently (‘billion’). Anna and Bertie are
therefore merely talking past each other.
In the literature on merely verbal disputes, this verdict on the case and
the rationale behind it are uncontroversial. An appearance to the contrary
seems to be due to differences in the adopted framework. According to
Balcerak Jackson (2014, 45), the defining feature of a merely verbal
dispute is that its disputants (i) address questions about different subject
matters yet (ii) provide non-conflicting answers to these different ques-
tions (whereas paradigmatic non-verbal disputes are characterised by dis-
putants intending to provide conflicting answers to a question about the
same subject matter). Thus in Balcerak Jackson’s view, Anna’s and Bertie’s
dispute is merely verbal because there is no specific question under discus-
sion both disputants intend to answer differently in the context of their
7‘Speaker’s meaning’ is to be understood in a broadly Gricean fashion here (Grice 1957, 1969): The speak-
er’s meaning of e uttered by a speaker s in a certain context c is what s intends to convey by uttering e
in c. This way the speaker’s meaning of e can – but does not have to – diverge from the linguistic
meaning of e. (Cf. a case in which a speaker is using e ironically.)
8Let us call an expression e a key expression of a merely verbal dispute between A and B if e grounds A’s
and B’s linguistic misunderstanding by being used with different speaker’s meaning. Hence whether an
expression is a key expression of a dispute crucially depends on the role the expression plays in an
explanation of how the dispute came about, despite A’s and B’s non-disagreement about the
subject matters under discussion. Note that e can stand for atomic as well as complex expressions
(see Vermeulen 2018, 338f).
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dispute. Anna and Bertie are answering different questions, i.e. questions
with different subject matters: Anna intends to answer the question of
whether one trillion is 1012, while Bertie intends to answer the question
whether one billion is 1012. These questions concern different topics,
and because the disputants’ answers do not in any way conflict (after
all, there is no relevant disagreement between Anna and Bertie, they
are simply using ‘billion’ differently), their dispute is a merely verbal one.9
Balcerak Jackson’s account not only delivers the intuitively correct
verdict about Anna’s and Bertie’s dispute, it also captures an apparently
quite natural idea about the relation between merely verbal disputes
and topics. According to his account, Anna and Bertie have a merely
verbal dispute, grounded in the fact that they are talking about
different topics. Generalising upon this idea, we can say that speakers in
a merely verbal dispute are merely talking past each other, because unbe-
knownst to them they are talking about different subject matters which
they are not in fact in disagreement upon. This general idea of the relation
between topics and merely verbal disputes seems intuitively compelling.
Note, though, that to maintain it, topics have to be individuated quite
finely. For, as the next three examples show, the relevant difference in
topics grounding the mere verbalness of a dispute can actually be due
to quite subtle differences in the disputants’ usage of a term.
(2)
Chris: ‘The number of members of my family is necessarily even.’
Dora: ‘No, the number of members of your family is not necessarily even.’
Assume that Chris and Dora agree that eight is necessarily even whereas
13 is not. Yet despite this agreement, both are engaged in a sincere
dispute. For Chris uses ‘family’ in a way that only includes first-degree rela-
tives. Dora, however, uses ‘family’ more widely to include other relatives
as well. Thus Chris and Dora intend to answer different questions with
their utterances. The question Chris intends to answer with his utterance
is the question of whether the number eight is necessarily even (since
Chris has eight first-degree relatives). Dora, in contrast, intends to
answer a different question: is the number 13 necessarily even? The two
are therefore having a merely verbal dispute: due to their divergent
9Balcerak Jackson’s general account of mere verbalness is widely accepted in the literature. Even Inga
Vermeulen (2018, 346) admits that talking about different questions is a ‘convenient way of putting
the problem at the heart of verbal disputes’, although she criticises Balcerak Jackson’s account as
being too implicit about how to identify the different questions under discussion.
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usage of ‘family’, their utterances are intended to offer non-conflicting
answers to questions regarding different subject matters.
(3)
Chris: ‘The number of members of my family is necessarily even.’ (de re)
Dora: ‘No, the number of members of your family is not necessarily even.’ (de
dicto)
The same dispute between Chris and Dora can also figure as an example of
another merely verbal dispute. In example (2) the questions Chris and Dora
intend to answer are both to be read de re, as questions about specific
numbers – albeit different numbers. However, the two disputants would
alsobe talkingpast eachother if oneparty attempted toaddress ade re-ques-
tion about a specific number while the question the other party intended to
answerwere to be read de dicto. To see this, look at Chris’ and Dora’s dispute
again and imagine the two are using ‘family’ in the same fashion. Assume
further that Chris’ statement is still intended as an answer to the de re-ques-
tion regarding thenumber eight, i.e. the question ofwhether eight is necess-
arily even. If Dora’s statement is to be read de dicto now, she andChris could,
again, merely be talking past each other. Imagine Dora simply intends to
communicate that it is not necessarily the case that Chris has an even
number of close family members (– Chris’ mother could possibly have had
another child, for example). If there were no disagreement between Chris
and Dora as to what the respective parties intended to communicate, the
twowould be engaged in anothermerely verbal dispute. Due to an ambigu-
ity in scope both would be addressing questions pertaining to different
subject matters, thus providing non-conflicting answers to them (see also
Vermeulen (2018, 339) on merely verbal disputes and scope).
(4)
The difference in topics is not exclusively due to either a difference in
reference or an ambiguity in scope. It can also be due to a difference in
‘colouring’ (see Belleri’s 2018, 695 brief remark on this):
Eva: ‘Dora adores her cur.’
Fred: ‘Dora doesn’t own a cur!’
Assume that Eva and Fred know that Dora owns a dog, Pixie, and the two
agree that Pixie is adorable. Eva just mistakenly thinks that ‘cur’ and ‘dog’
can be used interchangeably: in contrast to Fred, Eva does not know that
‘cur’ is a pejorative for dogs. Consequently, the speakers in (4) are using
‘cur’ differently. Fred is (correctly) using the term as a pejorative for
dogs whereas Eva is not. Furthermore, because Eva and Fred also agree
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that Pixie is lovely and not a cur, there is no relevant disagreement between
them either. Thus, ‘[t]here is no question under discussion to which the
parties offer conflicting answers’, as Balcerak Jackson (2014, 42) would
put it. Due to a difference in the usage of ‘cur’, the two simply intend to
answer questions pertaining to slightly, yet relevantly different subject
matters: ‘Does Dora adore her dog?’ (Eva) and ‘Does Dora own a cur?’
(Fred). The two speakers are therefore merely talking past each other.
* * *
Despite their differences, examples (1–4) share at least two important
features: the parties (i) are attempting to answer different questions (i.e.
questions on different subject matters), however (ii) they do not disagree
on the answers to those questions (i.e. provide non-conflicting answers to
these). This brings us back to the natural idea concerning the relation
between mere verbalness and topics mentioned before. It seems
natural to take two or more disputants as merely talking past each
other because they are talking about different topics. If we want to main-
tain this idea about merely verbal disputes, we clearly need a sufficiently
fine-grained notion of topics. We then need a notion that can account for
the fact that even disputants who are just using an expression with
different colouring (like Eva and Fred), or in a different reading (like
Chris and Dora) are speaking about different topics.
With this in mind, let us now turn to Cappelen’s account of topics and
topic (dis)continuity.
3. Cappelen’s solution
As briefly elaborated in Section 1, ameliorating the meaning of terms
increases the likelihood of merely verbal disputes between speakers
using those terms. According to Cappelen, his account of topic (dis)con-
tinuity avoids this danger of mere verbalness. His idea seems simple. If we
can come up with an account of topic continuity according to which pre-
and post-ameliorators are talking about the same topic, the danger of
them merely talking past each other is avoided:
Topic continuity enables us to avoid verbal disputes. Extensions and intensions
might have changed, but as long as we’re still talking about the same thing, the
danger of verbal dispute is avoided. (2018, 114)
This seems to accord with what was said earlier. If merely verbal disputes
are grounded in disputants contributing to different topics, then making
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sure that pre- and post-ameliorators are talking about the same topic also
ensures that they do not talk past each other. Let us therefore look a bit
more closely at Cappelen’s account of topic continuity. What notion of
topics does he appeal to? And, more importantly, does Cappelen’s
account really avoid the risk of pre- and post-ameliorators talking past
each other?
Cappelen’s account of topic preservation is based on the notion of
samesaying. If two people are saying the same thing, they are also
talking about the same topic, according to Cappelen. However, as
examples about speakers using context-sensitive terms (like e.g. ‘smart’)
suggest, samesaying is ‘more coarse-grained than extensions’, as Cappe-
len (2018, 112–3) puts it, so ‘sameness of topic is as well’. As a result speak-
ers can say the same thing with a sentence even though they use some
expression(s) in it differently – even though ‘a tiny bit of semantic drift’
occurs.
Consider briefly Dorr’s and Hawthorne’s ‘salad’ example illustrating this
idea. The example builds on the observation that people used to apply
the word ‘salad’ only to ‘cold dishes with a high preponderance of
green leaves of some sort’, whereas nowadays the term is used much
more widely, including all kinds of ‘warm, leaf-free concoctions’ (Dorr
and Hawthorne 2014, 284). The meaning of ‘salad’ seems to have
changed. Can speakers before and after this change of meaning (herein-
after: ‘pre- and post-ameliorators’) nevertheless be reported as having
said the same thing about salads (e.g. that they are usually healthy)?
According to Cappelen, they can! Take, for instance, a conversation
between Granny and Hendrik and assume that Granny uses ‘salad’ the
old-fashioned (narrow) way, whereas Hendrik means ‘salad’more liberally.
Their conversation then goes like this:
Granny: ‘Salads are usually healthy.’
Hendrik (nodding affirmatively): ‘Salads are usually healthy.’
Cappelen would reconstruct this conversation as having a continuous
topic: salads. The subject of Granny’s and Hendrik’s conversation does
not change when Hendrik starts speaking about salads – it remains the
same even though Hendrik uses ‘salad’ with a wider extension than
Granny does. According to Cappelen, there is an intuitive and established
sense in which the two are saying the same. And this is supposed to be the
sense relevant to preserve topics of conversation between pre- and post-
ameliorators, and hence to avoid merely verbal disputes between them.
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Cappelen’s notion of samesaying also suggests an easy solution to the
Strawsonian critique of conceptual engineering: simply adopt an account
of topic (dis)continuity based on coarse-grained notions of samesaying
and topic! For we can then construe pre- and post-ameliorators as
talking about the same topic, so a change of meaning no longer results
in a change of topic.
As argued in the two sections following, however, the solution Cappe-
len proposes does not fulfil its duty. Instead of avoiding ‘massive amounts
of verbal dispute’ (2018, 8), taking pre- and post-ameliorators as talking
about the same topic actually makes the situation worse.
4. Against Cappelen’s solution
To see that, consider Granny and Hendrik again. This time imagine they
are disputing about Hendrik’s daughter Isabel, thereby still using the
word ‘salad’ differently:
Granny: ‘There is no salad Isabel likes.’
Hendrik: ‘Not true. There is a salad Isabel likes.’
According to Cappelen, the topic of this dispute does not undergo any
changes despite the speakers’ divergent usage of ‘salad’. The situation
is still the same as it was when Granny and Hendrik were talking about
the healthiness of salads (see Section 3). What has changed is that their
new dispute now is about which salads Isabel likes. But, as in their
former conversation about salads, the subject matter under discussion
remains the same throughout their dispute, although Granny and
Hendrik are using ‘salad’ differently.
I agree that there is an interesting sense in which both disputants are
talking about the same topic – Isabel and what salads she likes. Yet build-
ing an account of topic continuity based on this observation does nothing
to avoid the possibility of merely verbal disputes between pre- and post-
ameliorators. Why? As noted above, merely verbal disputes are essentially
characterised by two features: (i) there is no relevant disagreement
between the disputants of such disputes but (ii) they use a key expression
with different speaker’s meaning. Granny and Hendrik, though, are using
the word ‘salad’ with different speaker’s meaning. Granny uses it to refer
to green salads, whereas Hendrik uses the expression much more liberally
to make reference to all kinds of salads. Is there a further possibility of
them not disagreeing about what their interlocutor is intending to say?
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Of course there is. Just imagine a situation in which Granny knows that
Isabel likes noodle salad, and noodle salad also is the kind of salad
Hendrik has in mind when uttering his objection. Both know, let’s say,
that noodle salad is the only salad Isabel likes. There is then no relevant
disagreement between Granny and Hendrik: both agree that Isabel likes
noodle salad but does not like green salad. Accordingly, there is the possi-
bility of Granny and Hendrik merely talking past each other. And this
possibility obtains although Cappelen would construe the two speakers
as talking and disputing about the same topic.10
Imagine another example:
Jane: ‘Pixie is smart.’
Kendrick: ‘No, Pixie is not smart.’
Assume the two speakers are using ‘smart’, a context-sensitive term, differ-
ently. By saying ‘smart’ they have different comparison classes inmind.What
Jane means by uttering ‘Pixie is smart’ is that Pixie is smart for a dog. Ken-
drick, on the other hand, intends to convey with his statement that Pixie
is not smart compared to human beings such as him and Jane. Despite
this difference in usage, Jane and Kendrick are speaking about the same
topic according toCappelen’s account: they are speakingabout Pixie’s smart-
ness. Yet even if Jane and Kendrick are using ‘smart’ as stipulated in the
example, there is a possibility of them merely talking past each other. For
instance, if Jane doesn’t think that Pixie is smart compared to human
persons, and Kendrick admits that Pixie is quite smart for a dog, then
there is no relevant disagreement between Jane and Kendrick. The two
then not only use ‘smart’ differently, they also agree on what the other
party is intending to convey with their utterance. So, again, this seems like
an example of two disputants merely talking past each other despite the
fact that they are talking about the same topic in Cappelen’s sense.
5. Consequences
In the foregoing section it is argued that pre- and post-ameliorators can
have a merely verbal dispute even if they are talking about the same topic
in Cappelen’s sense. Why exactly is this result problematic?
10Of course, this is not the only possible interpretation of Hendrik’s and Granny’s dispute. For instance,
they could also be engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation about ‘salad’, thereby really disagreeing on
whether to use ‘salad’ for noodle salads or not (see Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Plunkett 2015). The
possibility of speakers merely talking past each other despite a continuity of topic (in Cappelen’s
sense), however, seems sufficient to show that Cappelen’s topic continuity does not avoid the risk
of mere verbalness.
INQUIRY 11
First and foremost because it is not what Cappelen has promised.
Remember: his account of topic continuity was built to circumvent the
danger of merely verbal disputes between pre- and post-ameliorators.
Topic continuity was supposed to enable us ‘to avoid verbal disputes’,
as Cappelen (2018, 114) puts it. Yet as we have seen, if we understand
‘topic’ in the coarse-grained way Cappelen suggests, speakers actually
can talk past each other even if there is no change in topic during their
dispute. The underlying reason for this is simple: differences in usage
with the potential of giving rise to merely verbal disputes can be extre-
mely subtle. Slight semantic divergences, tiny differences in what the
speakers have in mind (such as differences in colouring or scope, for
instance), are already sufficient to cause a merely verbal dispute (see
Section 2). Thus, appealing to a coarse-grained notion of topics designed
to be insensitive to such differences can be of no help to avoid the danger
of mere verbalness.
To be sure, there might still be an important and intuitive sense in
which two speakers are saying the same with their utterances despite a
difference in usage. Think of Granny and Hendrik again:
Granny: ‘Salads are usually healthy.’
Hendrik (nodding affirmatively): ‘Salads are usually healthy.’
There might well be a sense in which Granny and Hendrick are saying the
same despite the difference in usage. And certainly it is often appropriate
to report the two speakers as both having said that salads are healthy. For
some theoretical purpose it might also be useful to rely on this sense of
samesaying. The question, however, is whether this wide sense of same-
saying is the one conceptual engineers should build their account of topic
continuity on. This paper argues that it is not if topic continuity is to
enable us to avoid the danger of mere verbalness. We then should not
employ a coarse-grained notion of topics according to which pre- and
post-ameliorators are talking about the same topic despite using at
least one key expression of their discussion differently. That is, we
should not use a notion of topics according to which Granny and
Hendrik, for instance, are talking about the same topic despite using
‘salad’ differently. For, as we have seen in Section 4, even then the two
can merely talk past each other. Furthermore, the wide notion of topics
is also incompatible with the seemingly natural idea about merely
verbal disputes and their relation to topics, presented in Section 2. Follow-
ing this idea, disputants of a merely verbal dispute are talking past each
other because they are talking about different topics. (According to
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Balcerak Jackson’s prominent account, merely verbal disputes are defined
as disputes in which the disputants intend to offer non-conflicting
answers to questions with different subject matters.) If conceptual engin-
eers want to uphold this intuitively compelling thought, they should not
employ the wide notion of topics which Cappelen’s account advocates.
Moreover, ensuring that pre- and post-ameliorators are talking about
the same topic in Cappelen’s sense does not only not prevent them
from having a merely verbal dispute. Employing the advocated wide
use of ‘topic’ actually makes the situation even worse: it seems to
increase the danger of overlooking merely verbal disputes between
pre- and post-ameliorators. As we have seen, a (more or less subtle)
difference in usage is what actually constitutes the mere verbalness
of a dispute. Thus, what certainly helps to clear an ongoing discussion
from merely verbal disputes is to explicitly point out potential differ-
ences in how participants in the debate use some of its key expressions.
One might then try to eliminate the suspicious expressions from the
discussion, reformulate the disputants’ thoughts without these
expressions and see whether there is any real disagreement left (see
Chalmers’ method of elimination (2011, 526–7)). What certainly does
not help to detect and resolve merely verbal disputes is to downplay
the difference between speakers using a term differently and instead
highlight what they have in common. Yet highlighting what pre- and
post-ameliorators have in common is, of course, exactly what any
account of topic continuity does which construes them as talking
about the same topic. Such accounts therefore help to keep merely
verbal disputes off the radar.
6. Objection and reply
The paper so far concerns the worry that any change in concept increases
the risk of generating merely verbal disputes between pre- and post-ame-
liorators. As we have seen, the worry is legitimate. If pre- and post-ame-
liorators express a different or modified concept with an expression e,
they use e differently. And subtle as this difference may be, using e differ-
ently increases the risk of a merely verbal dispute between them. And this
risk is not reduced by any account of topic (dis)continuity according to
which pre- and post-ameliorators are talking about the same topic
despite a change in concept. To the contrary, using the corresponding
coarse-grained/wide notion of topics (TOPICWIDE) makes the situation
worse.
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To be fair, though, the worry of mere verbalness is not the only
worry conceptual engineers attempt to address by vindicating a
coarse-grained notion of topics. Taking pre- and post-ameliorators as
talking about the same topic allegedly also captures some of our intui-
tions on topic continuity. This section is devoted to taking a closer look
at a delicate example. This example is supposed to evoke the intuition
that pre- and post-ameliorators are talking about the same topic
despite a change in concept. I shall provide, however, an alternative
explanation of those intuitions which eventually suggests a re-evalu-
ation of the Strawsonian objection against conceptual engineering
(cf. Section 7).
Here is the example:
As Hasday (2000) persuasively argues, as late as the nineteenth century, the idea
that rape could not occur between married partners was built into the very
concept. And yet, feminists didn’t change the subject when they insisted that
it was possible for a husband to rape his wife. Accepting this claim required
changing the concept of rape. But, it would have been an obvious mistake to
object to these feminists by claiming that their arguments were beside the
point, merely changing the subject. […] The intuitive view in cases like these
is not that the subject changed, but that we learned something about the
subject we were concerned with all along. Conceptual change is not coexten-
sive with subject change. (Prinzing 2018, 859)
For the sake of the argument, assume with Hasday that by uttering ‘rape’,
speakers of the past really did express a concept of rape according to
which rape can only occur between non-married partners (let’s refer to
this concept as ‘RAPEOLD’). Feminists then fought for a change of
concept. Did they merely change the topic of conversation? This paper
so far has implicitly argued for the use of a fine-grained notion of
topics: if we prefer an account of topic continuity sensitive to the risk
of merely verbal disputes between pre- and post-ameliorators, we
should individuate topics such that speakers are talking about different
topics pre- and post-amelioration. Given this fine-grained understanding
of ‘topic’, however, feminists apparently did change the topic of conversa-
tion when changing the concept of rape. When they argued that rape can
also happen in a marriage, they already had a different or changed
concept of rape in mind (let’s refer to this concept as ‘RAPENEW’).
11 Conse-
quently, given the fine-grained understanding of ‘topic’, by employing
11As mentioned above, this paper leaves the question open whether RAPENEW is (i) a numerically different
concept than RAPEOLD or (ii) merely qualitatively different from RAPEOLD yet numerically the same.
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the ameliorated concept of rape RAPENEW feminists did change the topic
under discussion.
According to Prinzing, however, this interpretation intuitively miscon-
strues the situation. Using the fine-grained notion of topics does not
capture our intuitions about the example. For intuitively, what feminists
of the nineteenth century argued for – that rape can and does happen
between married partners – was not simply ‘beside the point’. Feminists
did not just change the topic of conversation, but intuitively, people
learned something new about rape from them. What they fought for
was a change of belief, not a change of topic. If Prinzing is right,
though, this means that we should use a notion of topics according to
which feminists did not merely change the topic when entering the con-
versation. In other words: the example is supposed to show that we
should not use the notion of topics advocated above (i.e. TOPICNARRROW).
For allegedly, it is only a coarse-grained notion of topics that fits the intui-
tive data about the rape case.12
What to make of this objection against a more narrow conception of
topics? On the one hand, it seems right to insist on three important desi-
derata: (i) feminists did not merely change the subject when entering the
scene, (ii) they really educated people on an important matter, and (iii)
there was real disagreement between them and people using RAPEOLD.
On the other hand, these three desiderata can also be accommodated
by an alternative interpretation of the case that is compatible with the
narrow conception of topics. In the following I will argue for this interpret-
ation and evaluate its results.
According to the alternative interpretation, pre-ameliorators about
‘rape’ and feminists (i.e. post-ameliorators about ‘rape’) were engaged
in a metalinguistic negotiation (Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Plunkett
2015): feminists were fighting an outdated and dangerous belief about
how we should use ‘rape’. Whereas people before the feminist movement
were convinced that employing RAPEOLD is right, feminists pleaded against
12Prinzing (2018) tackles the problem of topic (dis)continuity by advocating a functionalist account of
concepts. According to his view, the topic of a conversation, dispute or an inquiry is held constant
if the pre-engineering concept changes. According to Prinzing, there are identity-preserving
changes of concepts: if a concept can continue to perform its function the concept can undergo
change without ceasing to exist. And if the identity of a concept is preserved, then this also holds
the topic under discussion constant. (For another functionalist approach to topics see e.g. Thomasson
2020). This paper remains silent on the question whether identity-preserving changes of concepts are
possible or not. Even if they are possible, however, then identity-preserving changes in Prinzing’s sense
do not avoid merely verbal disputes between pre- and post-ameliorators (see Prinzing (2018, 860) on
the ‘salad’-example, which is supposed to show that ‘some changes in meaning are compatible with
subject-continuity’).
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this. They convincingly argued that violent sexual acts between married
partners should also be called ‘rape’; i.e. they convincingly made the
case for RAPENEW. They negotiated the meaning of ‘rape’ and fought for
the right answer to the question ‘which concept should “rape” (or an
apt translation of it) express in a linguistic community: RAPEOLD or
RAPENEW?’.
13
Does this interpretation of the case satisfy our three desiderata? It does
indeed. Let’s revisit these briefly in reverse order:
Desideratum (iii) Given the metalinguistic interpretation of the example,
there is real disagreement between the disputants. Whereas pre-ame-
liorators believed that employing RAPEOLD is right, feminists argued
against this very belief: they did not (and do not) think speakers
should employ RAPEOLD. The metalinguistic character of their dispute
may not have been made explicit. But that is exactly howmetalinguis-
tic negotiations are characterised. In metalinguistic negotiations, ‘a
linguistic expression [here: ‘rape’] is used (notmentioned) to commu-
nicate information about the appropriate usage of that very
expression in context’ (Plunkett and Sundell 2013, 3).14 So, desidera-
tum (iii) is satisfied: if we follow the alternative metalinguistic
interpretation of the sample case, we can uphold the belief that fem-
inists and others were really disagreeing about the right usage of the
word ‘rape’.
Desideratum (ii) By arguing for employing RAPENEW, feminists furthermore
educated people on an important matter: they taught them which
concept we should express by ‘rape’. And this is a serious normative
topic. After all, ‘rape’ has extremely negative lexical effects (see Cap-
pelen 2018, 128–31) on such effects). Calling an action ‘rape’ morally
condemns it. The suggested metalinguistic negotiation between fem-
inists and others in the nineteenth century therefore concerned the
crucial normative matter of which sexual acts to condemn and
13Note that interpreting feminists of the nineteenth century as suggesting affirmative answers to ques-
tions such as ‘Is it possible for a husband to rape his wife?’ or ‘Can rape occur between married part-
ners?’ seems to violate the principle of charity. Because if ‘rape’ back then really expressed RAPEOLD (as
stipulated in the case description), then these questions had obvious answers: it is simply conceptually
true that it is not possible for a husband/wife to rapeold his/her married partner. Interpreting feminists
as providing affirmative answers to those questions about rapeold therefore assumes they are making
simple conceptual mistakes. In general, such interpretations should therefore be avoided. (See e.g.
Hirsch (2005, 71f) on ‘charity to understanding’.)
14Also note that, according to Plunkett and Sundell (2014, 2019), disputants of a metalinguistic nego-
tiation need not always be aware of what exactly they are doing when negotiating how to use a
term. They might even reject a characterisation of themselves as being engaged in a metalinguistic
dispute. See also Thomasson (2017, §6) on the role speakers’ intentions play in metalinguistic disputes.
16 V. KNOLL
whom to blame (cf. Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 17–8) on so called
‘background conditions’ of metalinguistic negotiations). Feminists
thus gave others an important lesson in conceptual ethics.15 They
convincingly argued that ‘rape’ should not be used narrowly,
although this usage was semantically correct at that time (as it is sti-
pulated in the example).
Desideratum (i) Most importantly, we do not want to construe feminists
as merely changing the topic when entering the discussion. Can the
metalinguistic interpretation also satisfy this desideratum, even if
we read ‘topic’ as expressing the advocated narrow conception? It
can indeed. According to the metalinguistic proposal, pre- and
post-ameliorators give conflicting answers to the very same metalin-
guistic question – a question about the right usage of ‘rape’. In other
words, feminists just thought about the same topicnarrow differently
than people advocating the usage of RAPEOLD. Accordingly, feminists
did not change the topicnarrow of conversation. They simply argued
for a new answer to the same metalinguistic question: ‘Which
concept should “rape” (or an apt translation of it) express in a linguis-
tic community: RAPEOLD or RAPENEW?’
But what if people never thought about how to best use the word
‘rape’ before feminists entered the picture? In such case as well, of
course, feminists did not merely change the topicnarrow under discus-
sion. For in that case there was no discussion about the usage of
‘rape’ until feminists started it. And starting this new discussion, a
metalinguistic negotiation about ‘rape’, should certainly not be proble-
matised – quite the contrary, indeed. Setting a new topic by finally
raising moral issues about the right usage of ‘rape’ should be con-
sidered one of the many great achievements of modern feminism. So
even if feminists started the metalinguistic negotiation about
‘rape’, their arguments were not ‘beside the point’ either. Instead,
there simply was no point at the time until feminists started arguing
about it.
***
15Since in conceptual ethics ‘“practical” [as well as] “theoretical” considerations (like cutting nature at the
joints) are often front and center’ (Burgess and Plunkett 2013, 1094), at least in theory, feminists’ can
justify their metalinguistic claim by providing various normative reasons: metaphysically loaded ones
(e.g. RAPEOLD is not as joint-carving as RAPENEW and we should try to maximise joint-carvingness in our
language) as well as e.g. genuinely ethical reasons (e.g. employing RAPEOLD is harmful to victims of
violent sexual acts in marriages and we should not foster harm by the way we talk). So, note that
the conception of ethics here is quite broad, concerning all kinds of ‘normative and evaluative theoriz-
ing’ (Burgess and Plunkett 2013, 1094).
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In conclusion we can sum up the situation as follows: Prinzing’s sample
case raises an interesting worry regarding the narrow conception of
topics in the field of conceptual engineering. As we have seen, though,
his worry can be answered. For there is a plausible metalinguistic
interpretation available of what feminists were arguing for. According
to this interpretation, they wanted to negotiate the proper usage of the
word ‘rape’. And this interpretation not only fulfils desideratum (ii) and
(iii). It also allows us to understand feminists of the nineteenth century
either as not changing the topicnarrow under discussion or as simply
setting up a new topic on the right usage of ‘rape’.
7. Generalising the lesson
The lesson from the example above generalises, I think. Moreover, its dis-
cussion does more than shed new light on the discontinuity objection. As
argued in this last section, it could also lead to a revised understanding of
what we should see as the goal of conceptual engineering.
For the sake of the argument, let’s individuate topics in the suggested
narrow way. Take then a debate in which some philosophers are discuss-
ing questions such as ‘What is it to be an F?’ or ‘Are all Fs essentially Fs?’.
Assume further that conceptual engineers enter this debate and bring
forward suggestions how to ameliorate the concept of an F. Are they
thus suggesting changing the topic under discussion by either replacing
or revising the concept of an F? They are. I will not side with either the
replacement or the revisionist camp here.16 But no matter how the
change of topic is suggested to be brought about, as in the feminists’
case presented in the last section, the engineers’ contribution to the
debate should not usually be considered problematic.
To see that this is the case, just fill in somemore details. A paradigmatic
situation in which conceptual engineers would (hopefully) enter the dis-
cussion about Fs is, for instance, a situation in which ‘F’ expresses an inde-
terminate concept.17 Say, conceptual engineers now do their job and
bring forward a compelling suggestion how to specify the meaning of
‘F’ in a theoretically (more) fruitful or otherwise more preferable way.
Also assume that philosophers in the debate about Fs accept their
16Regardless of which camp is correct, a narrow account of topic has it that pre- and post-ameliorators
are addressing different subject matters when using the same term. This might either be the case
because they pair the term with numerically different concepts (replacement camp), or because
they pair it with numerically the same concept which is ‘merely’ qualitatively different (revisionist
camp).
17See Eklund (2004, 491) for a helpful distinction between three different kinds of indeterminacy.
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proposal and from then on ask questions such as ‘What is it to be an
Fspecified?’. Did conceptual engineers bring about a change of topic from
pre- to post-amelioration? Sure they did. But, again, this is nothing to
be worried about. The situation should rather be seen in analogy to the
feminists’ case. Feminists changed the way we are using ‘rape’ for the
better. Thus, they also changed the topic of discussion about rape,
sexual predators, sanctions etc. for the better – from a discussion about
rapeold to a discussion about a different but related topic: the topic of
rapenew. So why should conceptual engineers changing and improving
philosophers’ way of using ‘F’ not be understood as changing the topic
of the debate about Fs for the better?
Generally speaking, I would argue that the goal of conceptual engin-
eering should be seen as one of helping philosophers (and others) ask
and answer better questions. Sometimes asking better questions means
‘merely’ framing the same old questions raised in a debate in new
terms (because the terms in previous use have unwanted lexical effects,
for example, as ameliorators might point out). But most notably,
helping philosophers ask better questions also amounts to helping them
ask questions with better subject matters – subject matters more worthy
of their time and effort.18 On this understanding, there usually is no con-
tinuity of inquiry when conceptual engineers do their job well. Their main
job is to ameliorate concepts used in and outside philosophy. Accord-
ingly, their main endeavour might best be seen as one of changing
topics for the better.
This does not mean that we have to consider their job as one ofmerely
changing topics. Conceptual engineers do notmerely change topics; they
change topics because they have good reason to assume that there are
better (new) topics to discuss than the ones being addressed thus far. Con-
struing the goal of conceptual engineering as suggested does not mean
that conceptual engineers can and should arbitrarily change topics either.
This is not the right place to discuss constraints on conceptual engineer-
ing in detail, but it seems clear that no matter whether ameliorating con-
cepts amounts to replacing or to changing concepts, conceptual choices
are not simply doomed to be arbitrary. Depending on whether we con-
strue the overall project as one of replacement or revision, conceptual
choices will at least be subject to various pragmatic constraints – as well
18Note that ‘better’ or ‘more worthy’ might be spelled out differently here, depending on the concept or
term under discussion. ‘Better’ might sometimes relate to theoretical fruitfulness or joint-carvingness.
But to ask a better questionmight sometimes also mean to ask a question which, for example, is not (or
less) harmful to certain people.
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as conceptual constraints in case of revision. (After all, concepts presumably
would not persist through any kinds of changes.)19 But even if there were no
such conceptual constraints on topic change, this would not make the
project of engineering one of arbitrary choices either. Just imagine a philo-
sopher suggesting changing the debate about personal identity to a debate
on, say, the identity of donkeys by replacing PERSON by DONKEY. Wouldn’t we
immediately come up with a number of good reasons speaking against her
suggestion, even if the concept of a person were, say, hopelessly vague? Of
course, we would! Aside from the fact that it would be very hard (if not
impossible) to implement such a suggestion, philosophers might also
want to ensure, for instance, that no worthwhile philosophical question
(such as a question about the identity of personsspecified) is overlooked. In
addition, it also seems reasonable to avoid the philosophical expertise
acquired in an ongoing discussion (such as expertise on personal identity)
being lost because a topic is given up and replaced by a completely
different one (such as the topic of the identity of donkeys).
To be sure, the details of topic change are still to be discussed, as are
the various constraints on this project. But the overall outlook on the main
goal of conceptual engineering as one of changing topics to the better
seems entirely natural to me. In addition, if we construe the main goal
of conceptual engineering as suggested, conceptual engineers need
not worry about the Strawsonian objection either. Rather, they should
embrace the consequence of changing topics of ongoing philosophical
discussions. What they actually should worry about is the increased
danger of mere verbalness, as this paper has argued. This danger,
however, is not avoided by construing pre- and post-ameliorators as
talking about the same topic.
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